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EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT: PATH
DEPENDENCE AND THE BLESSING OF
UNDERTHEORIZATION
MICHAEL B. ADAMSON†
ABSTRACT
Some commentators have lamented that the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) is undertheorized—that its purpose is unclear—and
that its design is therefore suboptimal. This Note explores the credit’s
path-dependent past, which has resulted in a present-day EITC that
manifests a diverse, uncoordinated assortment of policy purposes.
Although the EITC’s ambiguity of purpose may yield policy
inefficiencies, this Note argues that it also produces significant
political benefits that would-be reformers who value the EITC’s many
societal benefits should take into account before they attempt to enact
any major overhaul.

INTRODUCTION
Commentators have bemoaned that the Earned Income Tax
1
Credit (EITC) is drastically undertheorized. Though this may sound
unequivocally bad, this Note shows that the EITC’s
2
undertheorization may actually be an advantage that policymakers
should not abandon lightly.

Copyright © 2016 Michael B. Adamson.
† Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2016; Brigham Young University, B.S.
2011. Thank you to Professor Richard Schmalbeck for inspiring this Note’s topic and to my
Duke Law Journal colleagues for guiding and motivating my many revisions. Thanks most of all
to my wife, Lauren, and my daughter, Sloane, for their love, patience, and encouragement.
1. See infra Part I.B.
2. Professor Lawrence Zelenak uses the term “undertheorized” to describe how Congress
has never explained the purpose of the EITC, “except in the vaguest and most general terms.”
Lawrence Zelenak, Redesigning the Earned Income Tax Credit as a Family-Size Adjustment to
the Minimum Wage, 57 TAX L. REV. 301, 301 (2004). Because the purpose of the EITC is
unclear, Professor Zelenak believes its design must be far from optimal. See id. (“Without a
clear idea of what the EITC is supposed to do, it is impossible to determine how it should be
designed.”).
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With the EITC at a crossroads, this insight may have significant
implications for its future. One reason to suspect policymakers may
be primed to change the EITC is that the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the current chairmen of the House Ways and
Means Committee and the Senate Committee on Finance have all
3
expressed a desire to enact tax reform in the 114th Congress, and
leaders have expressed guarded optimism about tax reform’s
4
likelihood. Even if tax reform—which brought with it a large EITC
5
expansion in 1986 —is unlikely due to the partisan divide between
Congress and President Obama, the President and Speaker Paul
Ryan have both recently proposed similar EITC expansions on which
6
there may be room for bipartisan compromise. Furthermore, EITC
advocates in Congress must act before 2018 to prevent a temporary
7
EITC expansion from expiring.

3. See Geoff Davis & James Carter, Ways and Means Chair’s Call to Action on Taxes,
THE HILL (Dec. 2, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/economy-budget/
261707-ways-and-means-chairs-call-to-action-on-taxes [http://perma.cc/XL7D-2H3T] (detailing
Kevin Brady’s strategic plan to “tee up pro-growth tax reform”); Brian Faler, Ryan’s Move
Could Be Big Boost for Tax Reform, POLITICO (Nov. 2, 2015, 5:12 AM), http://www.
politico.com/story/2015/11/paul-ryan-tax-reform-house-speaker-215405 [http://perma.cc/9JRHLBKS] (describing Speaker Paul Ryan’s desire to expand the EITC as part of broader plans to
enact comprehensive tax reform); Aaron E. Lorenzo, Hatch to Push Tax Rewrite as Incoming
Chairman of Senate Finance Committee, BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.bna.
com/hatch-push-tax-n17179911052 [http://perma.cc/Y287-YCU2] (outlining Senator Orrin
Hatch’s agenda for tax reform).
4. See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman, Chance for Tax Overhaul is Seen in Shift of Power, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/07/us/politics/republican-wins-may-leadto-fiscal-deal-with-democrats.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/EF4A-UDYN] (reporting on a
meeting between Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and President Barack Obama in
which the two cite tax reform as potential common ground). But see, e.g., Scott A. Hodge, Do
the Election Results Improve the Odds of Tax Reform?, TAX FOUNDATION (Nov. 5, 2014),
http://taxfoundation.org/blog/do-election-results-improve-odds-tax-reform
[http://perma.cc/
7BHZ-3A9Q] (“[T]he likelihood that it will be this Congress and this president making [a deal
on tax reform] seem[s] pretty remote.”).
5. See infra notes 203–20 and accompanying text.
6. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT & U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE
PRESIDENT’S PROPOSAL TO EXPAND THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT 5–7, 15–16 (2014),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/eitc_report.pdf
[http://perma.cc/C7NC-YB
6E] (recommending an EITC expansion for childless workers, funding such expansion with
additional tax revenue); PAUL RYAN, HOUSE BUDGET COMM. MAJORITY STAFF, EXPANDING
OPPORTUNITY IN AMERICA: A DISCUSSION DRAFT FROM THE HOUSE BUDGET COMMITTEE
27–29 (2014), http://budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/expanding_opportunity_in_america.pdf
[http://perma.cc/D6TR-RQH2] (proposing to expand the EITC for childless workers, funding
such expansion with cuts in welfare spending).
7. 26 U.S.C. § 32(b)(3) (2012).
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This Note first provides background information about the
EITC, discusses the cause of its undertheorization, and then explains
how such undertheorization may actually be a blessing, not a curse.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The EITC
The EITC has been a part of the tax code for more than forty
8
years. Congress enacted it in 1975 as part of a tax-reduction package
9
designed to address economic recession and high unemployment.
10
The original EITC had a maximum value of $400. Three years later,
noting the EITC’s efficacy in “providing tax relief for low income
families while at the same time providing work incentives for these
11
12
individuals,” Congress expanded the credit and made it permanent.
Congress further expanded the EITC and indexed it for inflation as
13
part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and expanded it in, among other
14
15
16
years, 1990, 1993, and 2001.
As a refundable credit, the EITC is somewhat unique among tax
17
expenditures. Unlike most tax expenditures, which individually or
collectively can do no more than reduce a taxpayer’s income-tax
18
liability down to zero, the EITC is refundable, meaning eligible
taxpayers enjoy the credit’s full value even if their precredit tax
liability is already zero. In other words, it functions “as a kind of

8. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
9. H.R. REP. NO. 94-19, at 3 (1975); S. REP. NO. 94-36, at 5 (1975).
10. Tax Reduction Act of 1975 § 204. In 2015 dollars, the maximum value of the credit was
about $1765. CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm [http://perma.cc/RAN2-6WNW].
11. S. REP. NO. 95-1263, at 52 (1978).
12. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 103, 92 Stat. 2763, 2771 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
13. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 111, 100 Stat. 2085, 2107 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
14. See infra notes 221–27 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 236–41 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 242–51 and accompanying text.
17. “The term ‘tax expenditures’ means those revenue losses attributable to provisions of
the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income
or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.” 2
U.S.C. § 622(3) (2012).
18. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 4152, REFUNDABLE TAX CREDITS 1 (2013).
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19

negative income tax.” As a simple illustration, consider a single
taxpayer who earned $10,000 in 2015. This taxpayer would realize no
20
value from a $100 deduction because her personal exemption and
21
standard deduction leave her no taxable income. Similarly, she
would not benefit from a $100 nonrefundable credit because she has
no tax liability against which to apply the credit. In contrast, a $100
refundable credit would be worth $100 to her because she could
receive it in the form of a payment.
The EITC’s refundability is an essential feature because the
22
credit is designed to benefit low-income taxpayers whose income-tax
23
liabilities tend to be low or nonexistent. The amount of the credit is
based on a taxpayer’s “earned income,” which includes wages,
salaries, and net earnings from self-employment, but does not include
24
investment income such as capital gains and dividends. The credit’s
value is calculated by multiplying the taxpayer’s earned income by the
25
applicable credit percentage. Thus, as the taxpayer earns more, her
26
credit increases until it reaches a maximum value. The credit then
plateaus until the taxpayer reaches another earnings threshold, after
which each additional dollar of earned income reduces a portion of
27
28
the credit until it is completely phased out. Figures 1 and 2
illustrate this process below.

19. RICHARD SCHMALBECK & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 791
(3d ed. 2011).
20. The personal exemption reduces taxable income. For 2015, the personal exemption
amount was $4000. Rev. Proc. 2014-61, 2014-47 I.R.B. 860, at 866.
21. The standard deduction reduces taxable income. For 2015, the standard deduction for
unmarried individuals was $6300. Id. at 865.
22. See Earned Income Tax Credit, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/Credits-&-Deductions/
Individuals/Earned-Income-Tax-Credit [https://perma.cc/F97S-29F3] (“The Earned Income Tax
Credit . . . is a benefit for working people with low to moderate income.”).
23. See ISAAC SHAPIRO & JOEL FRIEDMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET POLICY & PRIORITIES,
INCOME TAX RATES AND HIGH-INCOME TAXPAYERS: HOW STRONG IS THE CASE FOR MAJOR
RATE REDUCTIONS?, at ii (2001) (“Most low- and many moderate-income families . . . do not
owe federal income taxes.”).
24. 26 U.S.C. § 32(c)(2) (2012).
25. Id. § 32(b). The credit percentage depends on the number of qualifying children the
taxpayer has. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. The author created Figures 1 and 2 based on Rev. Proc. 2014-61, 2014-47 I.R.B. 863.
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Figure 1. 2015 EITC, Married Filing Jointly
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Figure 2. 2015 EITC, Single, Surviving Spouse, Head of Household
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The EITC has grown from its humble beginnings to become the
country’s “most significant federally administered anti-poverty

29. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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30

program.” The EITC’s projected cost for fiscal year 2015 is $70.4
31
billion. Its recorded cost in 2012, the most recent year for which the
32
IRS has published data, was $64.1 billion. Of that amount, only $1.2
33
billion went toward offsetting income-tax liabilities. Another $6.8
billion was used to offset other taxes, including Social Security and
34
Medicare taxes. The remaining $56.1 billion—accounting for nearly
90 percent of the credit’s cost—was disbursed in the form of a
35
government payment. In total, EITC-related outlays swamp the cost
36
of other major federally administered antipoverty programs. Largely
due to the enactment and growth of the EITC, the IRS has become
“one of the government’s principal welfare agencies, on par with the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Social
37
Security Administration.”
B. The Undertheorized EITC
38

Surprisingly, the EITC is “severely undertheorized” considering
its age and scope. Professor Lawrence Zelenak laments that Congress
has never explained the EITC’s purpose “except in the vaguest and
39
40
most general terms,” and a number of scholars echo this sentiment.
30. SCHMALBECK & ZELENAK, supra note 19, at 793.
31. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2014–2018, at 32 (Comm. Print 2014).
32. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. STATISTICS OF INCOME, RETURNS WITH EARNED INCOME
CREDIT, BY SIZE OF ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME, TAX YEAR 2012 (2014), http://www.irs.gov/
file_source/pub/irs-soi/12in25ic.xls [http://perma.cc/T6UG-2LCS].
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. For example, the 2014 cost of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
program was $16.5 billion. CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO TANF 2 (June 15, 2015), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/
files/7-22-10tanf2.pdf [http://perma.cc/A6DW-39MC]. Medicaid and the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as the Food Stamp program) cost more but are
administered at the state level. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2014
ACTUARIAL REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL OUTLOOK FOR MEDICAID, at i (2014) (reporting
Medicaid outlays in 2013 of $457.8 billion); U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM NATIONAL VIEW SUMMARY 1 (2016), http://www.fns.usda.gov/sites/
default/files/pd/34SNAPmonthly.pdf [http://perma.cc/2TBJ-HF4P] (Showing that SNAP outlays
for FY 2014 and FY 2015 were each just short of $70 billion); John L. Czajka, Can
Administrative Records Be Used to Reduce Nonresponse Bias?, 645 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 171, 175 n.1 (2013) (noting that SNAP and Medicaid are administered by the states).
37. Kristen E. Hickman, Administering the Tax System We Have, 63 DUKE L.J. 1717, 1730
(2014).
38. Zelenak, supra note 2, at 301.
39. Id.
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So how can it be that the EITC’s purpose remains fuzzy after forty
years of legislative history? In this Note, I do not attempt to divine a
singular, unified purpose undergirding the EITC. Instead, I explain
why the EITC lacks “any coherent purpose discernible from [its]
41
structure.” Specifically, I examine the role path dependence has
played in fueling the EITC’s advancement. By analyzing the EITC’s
path-dependent past, I uncover a surprising insight that policymakers
should take into account when considering the EITC’s future.
II. PATH DEPENDENCE
This Part introduces the concept of path dependence, explains
how it works in the economy and in policymaking, and describes its
value as a theoretical lens.
A. Path Dependence in Economics
The concept of path dependence is that “each step in one
42
direction makes additional steps in that same direction more likely.”
One of the primary mechanisms driving this tendency of directional
43
inertia is “increasing returns.” In the economy, increasing returns
44
arise as a result of four conditions: “large . . . fixed costs . . . ;
learning effects, which lower costs as a product becomes more
common; coordination effects, which confer benefits for taking action
similar to others; and . . . adaptive expectations, which lead actors to

40. E.g., CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX EXPENDITURES
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 64 (1999); Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Who’s Afraid of
Redistribution? An Analysis of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 74 MO. L. REV. 251, 258, 284
(2009); John J. Infranca, Note, The Earned Income Tax Credit as an Incentive to Report:
Engaging the Informal Economy Through Tax Policy, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 203, 218 n.87 (2008).
41. Zelenak, supra note 2, at 301.
42. Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 613 (2001).
43. Id. at 608.
44. A firm’s costs can be categorized as either fixed or marginal. KENNETH S. CORTS &
JAN W. RIVKIN, A NOTE ON MICROECONOMICS FOR STRATEGISTS 6 (2000). Fixed costs are
expenses that a firm must pay to carry on its business, regardless of the firm’s output. Id. For
example, building rent is a fixed cost because it costs the same no matter how many units a firm
produces. Id. Marginal costs, on the other hand—for example, raw materials and direct labor
costs—are directly proportional to production levels. Id. In any production process, as output
increases, the fixed costs per unit decrease. Id. at 7. Thus, a firm’s overall cost per unit—that is,
its combined fixed and marginal costs per unit—will decline as output increases (at least until
the firm approaches its maximum production capacity). Id.
AND

ADAMSON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1446

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/14/2016 12:22 PM

[Vol. 65:1439

react to current conditions in ways that enhance the likelihood that
45
similar conditions will persist . . . .”
Path dependence is perhaps best illustrated through a historical
example: the QWERTY keyboard, which Christopher Latham Sholes
46
patented in 1868. Some historians claim that Sholes arranged
QWERTY’s keys to resolve mechanical failures that plagued early
47
typewriter prototypes. Others argue that he intentionally designed
QWERTY to be nonintuitive in order to support a marketing scheme
in which typewriter manufacturer Remington could sell typing
48
courses to typewriter purchasers. Still others suggest Sholes intended
QWERTY to be responsive to the morse-code-translation needs of
49
telegraph operators. Of course, none of these design purposes
remain relevant in the twenty-first century. Yet, the QWERTY
keyboard is still the standard keyboard arrangement for computers,
50
tablets, and phones in English-speaking countries. Path dependency
best explains its longevity.
Each of the four increasing-returns conditions mentioned above
contributed to the QWERTY keyboard’s rise and sustained
dominance. First, Sholes incurred significant fixed start-up costs in
successfully bringing his invention to market; specifically, he devoted
51
ten years to research and development. Second, and perhaps most
significantly, once a critical mass of people learned how to type on the
QWERTY keyboard, other keyboard alternatives—which would
have compelled typists to undergo expensive retraining—became less
52
viable. This learning effect has been so acute and self-perpetuating
with QWERTY that the keyboard arrangement is still used today,
even on thumb-only devices like phones for which ten-digit
QWERTY training is only marginally beneficial. Third, within fifteen
years of QWERTY’s debut, the five largest typewriter manufacturers
45. Hathaway, supra note 42, at 609.
46. Jimmy Stamp, Fact of Fiction? The Legend of the QWERTY Keyboard, SMITHSONIAN
(May 3, 2013), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/fact-of-fiction-the-legend-of-theqwerty-keyboard-49863249/?no-ist [http://perma.cc/YJY4-9GUS].
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See id. (“The fate of the keyboard was decided in 1893 when the five largest typewriter
manufacturers . . . agreed to adopt QWERTY as the de facto standard that we know and love
today.”).
51. See id. (discussing the history of Sholes’s typewriter inventions and the evolution of the
keyboard).
52. Id.
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converged on QWERTY as the standard typewriter system, thereby
53
sharing, through coordination, in a larger, unified customer base.
Finally, both consumers and manufacturers responded to the initial
ascendancy of QWERTY so as to generate a feedback loop that has
not yet stopped churning: consumers bought QWERTY expecting it
to remain the market-leading technology and to be the arrangement
least likely to become obsolete and necessitate retraining;
manufacturers embraced QWERTY presumably because its customer
54
base was the largest and most likely to grow.
One of path dependence’s key insights is that increasing-returns
markets’ ultimate shape depends heavily on early events, which often
55
display a significant random element. In Professor Paul A. David’s
words, “[I]t is sometimes not possible to uncover the logic (or illogic)
of the world around us except by understanding how it got that
56
way.” In highlighting the role of randomness, path dependence
yields an important insight about market efficiency: as with a winding
fur trapper’s path that evolves first into a dirt road and then into a
rambling highway, current market institutions often fall short of
optimal efficiency. When institutions and individuals fail to critically
evaluate the increasing returns–driven directional inertia that propels
market evolution, they risk forgoing alternative and more efficient
paths—leaving them doomed to meander when blazing a straight trail
57
would be better.
B. Legal Path Dependence
The increasing-returns environment that precipitates path
dependence is at least as prevalent in the development of statutes as it

53. Id.
54. See id. (observing that “the fate of the keyboard was decided,” and the QWERTY’s
dominance cemented, when the QWERTY technology became the clear market leader).
55. Hathaway, supra note 42, at 610.
56. Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332, 332
(1985).
57. Firms in the economy—even leading ones best equipped to innovate—that fail to
recognize and analyze the role of path dependence in market and product evolution may
consequently miss opportunities to develop “disruptive innovations”—that is, revolutionary new
technologies that service previously unidentified or underdeveloped markets. See generally
CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES
CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL (1997) (describing how businesses lose market leadership
because of managers’ failure to abandon traditional business practices and to develop
“disruptive innovation”).
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58

is in that of products and markets. This Section details three factors
that help cultivate an increasing-returns environment in the U.S.
legislative process: collective action, policymakers’ short-term
59
orientation, and status quo bias. This Section then explains the value
of analyzing the role of path dependence in policy development.
1. Factors that Contribute to an Increasing-Returns Environment
in the U.S. Legislative Process. A collective-action problem emerges
when groups attempt to produce “public goods”—that is, goods that
are nonrivalrous (consumption by one does not prevent consumption
by others) and nonexcludable (all group members can freely consume
60
whether or not they contributed to production). Because all group
members obtain the same benefit from a public good, regardless of
whether they bear its production costs, they have an incentive to free
61
ride on the production costs of others. With all group members
incentivized to free ride rather than produce public goods, groups
62
tend not to produce such goods at socially optimal levels.
Collective action helps facilitate path dependence in the U.S.
legislative process. In the legislative context, “laws themselves have
63
the character of public goods for those who benefit from them.” For
example, legislators can obtain political benefits from the enactment
of popular legislation simply by voting for it, even if they otherwise
contribute nothing to its enactment. Moreover, the collective-action
problem inherent in the legislative process is particularly severe
because, unlike in economic markets in which individuals may be able
to innovate independently, no single individual can create a law by
64
herself; rather, all legislative participants must depend on others’

58. See Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 252 (2000) (“[I]ncreasing return arguments are at least as relevant to an
understanding of politics as they are in other areas of the social sciences.”).
59. Id. at 257–58, 261–62.
60. David E. Bernstein & Ilya Somin, Judicial Power and Civil Rights Reconsidered, 114
YALE L.J. 591, 603 (2004). A paradigmatic example of a public good is a lighthouse: one sailor’s
using a lighthouse to navigate does not prevent other sailors from doing the same, and withinsight-range sailors cannot be excluded from consuming lighthouse-emitted light. For a more indepth explanation of public goods, see generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE DEMAND AND
SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS (1968).
61. Bernstein & Somin, supra note 60, at 603.
62. Id.
63. Pierson, supra note 58, at 258.
64. President Barack Obama is one possible exception. Cf. Saturday Night Live (NBC
television broadcast Nov. 22, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JUDSeb2zHQ0
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actions—for example, their lobbying or campaigning efforts—to
65
achieve legislative objectives. As a result, in order to effect
significant policy change, a relatively large number of legislators must
66
simultaneously overcome the temptation to free ride. A policy, once
67
enacted, thus has a strong tendency to persist.
Policymakers’ short-term orientation also plays a considerable
role in facilitating legal path dependence. Policymakers tend to ignore
68
long-term consequences. One of the primary reasons for this is that
an election-minded president or member of Congress is far more
likely to care about current problems than those that arise after her
69
retirement. Resisting path dependence and implementing beneficial
70
innovations, however, often require a lengthened time horizon. In
the marketplace, a firm may be willing to invest in a revolutionary
technology—thereby overcoming path-dependence inertia—despite
71
short-term losses if it expects to realize offsetting long-term benefits.
In contrast, short term–focused policymakers tend to discount or
ignore long-term outcomes and are therefore less likely to incur any
72
short-term political costs necessary to forge an innovative policy
73
path.
Finally, the legislative process often results in path dependence
because political institutions tend to be harder to change than
74
economic institutions. This status quo bias results from two different

[http://perma.cc/38H9-JMRL] (spoofing President Obama’s unilateral policy response to
legislative gridlock over immigration policy).
65. Pierson, supra note 58, at 258.
66. See id. (“Whether you put energy into . . . join[ing] a potential coalition . . . may depend
to a considerable degree on your confidence that a large number of people will do the same.”).
67. See id. at 258–59 (“[D]espite massive social, economic, and political changes over time,
self-reinforcing dynamics associated with collective action processes mean that organizations
have a strong tendency to persist once they are institutionalized.”).
68. Richard Rose, Inheritance Before Choice in Public Policy, 2 J. THEORETICAL POL. 263,
286 (1990).
69. Id. As an illustrative anecdote, one of President Ronald Reagan’s senior advisers
responded to a bureaucrat’s concerns about the future viability of Social Security by quipping,
“We weren’t elected to solve the problems of 2010.” Id.
70. Pierson, supra note 58, at 261.
71. Id. at 261–62.
72. Such short-term costs may include efforts associated with lobbying colleagues,
pushback from special interest groups, and short-term voter dissatisfaction during their changeadjustment period.
73. Id. at 262.
74. Id.
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75

phenomena. First, policy architects often design legislation to be
difficult to change in order to prevent “their” policies from being
76
overturned or co-opted by opponents. Second, political actors often
attempt to bind themselves and—especially in the case of presidents
and members of their parties—to support a policy in the future by
77
expressing support for it in the present.
2. The Implications of Legal Path Dependence. Analyzing the
role of path dependence in policy development yields three benefits.
78
In a world of purposive actors and the invisible hand, the assumption
that policies exist because they serve some especially valuable
79
purpose is tempting. But scouring legislative history for evidence of
path dependence can (1) expose policies premised on obsolete
80
purposes or random historical events, (2) prompt voters and
81
policymakers to contemplate radical policy innovation, and (3) fill
82
theoretical gaps. These benefits were manifest in a recent article by
Professor Steven L. Schwarcz that applied path-dependence analysis
to the special rights and immunities that the bankruptcy process gives
83
derivatives counterparties. Professor Schwarcz’s analysis both
revealed that and explained why such rights and immunities fail to
84
fulfill their stated purpose.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. This type of commitment is effective because politicians are often criticized for
changing their minds about policies. See, e.g., John Kerry, Flip-flopper?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 25,
2004, at 36 (describing the potency of President George W. Bush’s flip-flopping assertions
against Secretary John Kerry, who was a Senator and presidential candidate at that time).
78. See 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 453, 456 (6th ed., George Bell & Sons 1887):
[T]he study of [an individual’s] own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily leads
him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society. . . . [H]e
intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible
hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.
(emphasis added).
79. See Pierson, supra note 58, at 264 (“Arguments about increasing returns, however,
suggest the large dangers in any assumption that an institution arose because it serves some
particularly useful purpose.”).
80. See supra notes 46–50, 56–57 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 57.
82. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.
83. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Derivatives and Collateral: Balancing Remedies and
Systemic Risk, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 699 (examining whether U.S. bankruptcy law’s treatment of
creditors’ rights and immunities in derivatives transactions could be adapted to minimize
systemic risk).
84. Id.
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III. EVOLUTION OF THE EITC
A focus on increasing returns justifies a turn to history.

– Professor Paul Pierson

85

This Part delves into the EITC’s legislative history to set up the
path-dependence analysis undertaken in Part IV. It traces the EITC’s
history from its predecessor proposals to its enactment and
subsequent expansions.
A. Predecessor Proposals
The EITC was preceded by at least three ancestral proposals
made by economist Milton Friedman and Presidents Richard Nixon
and Gerald Ford.
1. Milton Friedman’s NIT. Economist Milton Friedman has been
86
called the “father of the negative income tax.” He first developed
the idea for a negative income tax (NIT) while at the Treasury
87
Department. In the beginning, Friedman saw the NIT as a solution
to fairness problems caused by graduated tax rates and fluctuating
88
incomes. He later came to recognize the NIT’s potential as a
89
mechanism for alleviating poverty.
Friedman liked the idea of administering an antipoverty measure
90
through the tax code for several reasons. First, Friedman saw the tax
code as an especially effective platform for alleviating poverty
because it allowed the government to premise assistance purely on

85. Pierson, supra note 58, at 263.
86. VINCENT J. BURKE & VEE BURKE, NIXON’S GOOD DEED: WELFARE REFORM 169
(1974).
87. DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, THE POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME 50 (1973).
88. Id. Because taxpayers generally pay higher marginal income-tax rates as their incomes
rise, taxpayers with fluctuating incomes tend to pay more taxes over time than taxpayers with
equivalent but steady incomes. See SCHMALBECK & ZELENAK, supra note 19, at 141 (providing
an illustration). This effect was particularly acute among low-income workers because income
fluctuations moved them back and forth between a zero tax bracket and a positive one.
MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 50. Friedman proposed an NIT as a way of evening out net tax
liabilities among similar earners over time—workers would pay taxes in good years and would
receive payments from the Treasury Department in bad ones. Id.
89. MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 50. Professor Lawrence Zelenak points out that, though
Friedman did not explicitly describe it as such, his NIT is basically a guaranteed annual income.
Zelenak, supra note 2, at 303.
90. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 191–93 (1962).
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the basis of a taxpayer’s low income, rather than on less relevant
92
factors like the recipient’s age or career. The NIT was also desirable
because it provided benefits in the form most useful to the recipient:
93
cash. Friedman viewed the NIT as a less-distortionary means of
raising incomes than the minimum wage, and he intended for his NIT
to replace the government’s “rag bag” of welfare programs as a
94
means of reducing administrative costs associated with antipoverty.
In addition, Friedman noted that a single consolidated antipoverty
measure would enable the public to better understand the cost and
95
evaluate the efficacy of the government’s antipoverty efforts.
Finally, Friedman liked that, unlike traditional welfare programs that
96
imposed 100 percent marginal tax rates on earnings, his NIT
proposal would preserve work incentives by imposing marginal tax
97
rates of 50 percent or less.
2. From Johnson’s Self-Help to Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan.
President Lyndon Johnson famously declared war on poverty in
98
1964. His proposals focused on “self-help” measures designed to
provide education, training, and work opportunities rather than
99
income support. Despite the Johnson administration’s efforts to
reduce dependence on welfare, welfare rolls grew steadily during the
100
1960s, leading some to ridicule Johnson’s war as “little more than a

91. Premising the NIT purely on low income is different from the modern-day EITC, which
requires work effort.
92. Id. at 191–92.
93. Id. at 192.
94. Id. at 191–93.
95. See id. at 192 (“[The NIT] makes explicit the cost borne by society.”).
96. For example, at that time, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program “operated on the principle that earnings of a welfare recipient would be deducted,
dollar-for-dollar, from welfare payments.” MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 50.
97. Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics: The Political History of
the Earned Income Tax Credit, in MAKING WORK PAY: THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT
AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICA’S FAMILIES 15, 18 (Bruce D. Meyer & Douglas Holtz-Eakin eds.,
2001).
98. See Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the U.S., State of the Union (Jan. 8, 1964),
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3382 [http://perma.cc/3SU6-GDBK] (“This
administration today, here and now, declares unconditional war on poverty in America.”).
99. Ventry, supra note 97, at 18–19.
100. Between 1960 and 1970, the number of Americans receiving welfare surged from 3.1
million to 9.0 million. Id. at 19. Ironically, President Johnson rejected an NIT because, in his
eyes, the proposal did not provide an adequate work incentive. Id. at 18.
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101

modestly financed skirmish.” Johnson’s social reforms “had been
oversold, and . . . underfinanced to the degree that seeming failure
102
could be ascribed almost to intent.”
103
President Nixon thus inherited a welfare “crisis” and turned to
a version of Friedman’s NIT as a solution. Social-welfare reform was
uncharted territory for Republicans whose participation in that realm
104
had traditionally consisted of opposing Democratic proposals.
105
Nixon in particular strongly opposed welfare. By the time he took
office, however, the problem of welfare dependency was severe,
visible, and intertwined with seething issues of poverty and racial
106
107
inequality;
Nixon felt compelled to respond.
Rather than
addressing the problem timidly and incrementally, Nixon saw an
108
opportunity to exalt his legacy and accordingly wanted first and
109
foremost for his reform proposal to be bold and creative. But
developing an ambitious and innovative proposal that might broaden
the party’s base of support among moderates and liberals while not
110
alienating conservatives proved difficult because the vast majority
of social scientists on whom Nixon might rely for expert advice were
111
politically liberal. The NIT ultimately gained traction because it
101. STANLEY ESTERLY & GLENN ESTERLY, FREEDOM FROM DEPENDENCE: WELFARE
REFORM AS A SOLUTION TO POVERTY 26 (1971); see also MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 55 (“A
good deal of money was being expended. It could not be shown that it was going to the poor. It
was going, in large degree, to purchase services which could not be shown to benefit the poor.”).
102. MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 66.
103. Id. at 59.
104. Id. at 64–65.
105. See id. at 86 (describing how Nixon’s “Puritan ethic” spurred his aversion toward
welfare); see also id. at 98 (noting that “[Nixon] was not neutral about welfare; he was against
it”).
106. The destruction of the poor, especially the black poor, by the existing welfare system
was “the most serious social problem of the time.” Id. at 214.
107. See id. at 68–69 (“Nixon was fated to deal with welfare” because, by the time he took
office, welfare dependency “was making its way to the center of national politics” and had
become “a condition about which something had to be done.”).
108. See id. at 74 (observing that Nixon’s awareness of his reputation in American history
played a role in his adopting an aggressive approach to welfare reform).
109. See id. at 74, 97 (describing Nixon’s desire to be both bold and innovative with respect
to welfare reform).
110. Sixty-eight percent of the population at the time described itself as either moderate or
conservative. Id. at 70.
111. See id. at 70, 96 (describing how Nixon enlisted advisers from the predominately liberal
ranks of social science, the inclination of whom was to “search for ways to provide more welfare
rather than less”). But see Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., From FDR to W: The IRS as Financial
Intermediary, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2002) (pointing out that the team of advisers who
oversaw Nixon’s welfare reform efforts also included Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Cheney).
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satisfied Nixon’s aspirations of boldness and innovation while also
113
obscuring—with
its
conservative
origin —the
proposal’s
114
progressivity.
The NIT became the central tenet of Nixon’s landmark 1969
welfare-reform proposal, the Family Assistance Plan (FAP). Before
proposing an NIT, Nixon had already ushered through Congress a
115
“low income allowance” that removed two million low-income
116
families from the federal income-tax rolls. Nixon’s NIT was
designed to provide further assistance in the form of an income floor
117
administered through the tax code.
Subject to a “work
118
119
families would receive a maximum benefit
requirement,”
corresponding with an earned income of zero up to a phaseout
120
threshold. Beyond that threshold, the maximum benefit would be

112. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 143 (“The alternatives open to the president were to
advocate some incremental changes in the existing system, or take the giant step to [the NIT].
He chose the latter.”).
113. See supra Part III.A.1.
114. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 127 (noting the NIT’s potential for obscuring a
guaranteed-income proposal); see also id. at 65 (describing how one liberal commentator, upon
learning about Friedman’s NIT, exclaimed, “[T]his conservative has provided us with a way to
get guaranteed income”).
115. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 802, 83 Stat. 487, 676 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
116. MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 114–15. Eliminating low-income families from the tax
rolls received little attention, but may have been “the most important development to that date
of the War on Poverty.” Id. at 115.
117. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., WELFARE REFORM FACT SHEET (1969), reprinted in
MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 229, 235 [hereinafter WELFARE REFORM FACT SHEET]
(presenting a sample NIT benefit schedule).
118. Id. at 231. The work requirement attached to the FAP stipulated that all
“[e]mployable” recipients would sacrifice their portion of NIT benefits if they refused to accept
either training or employment. Id. In other words, if an employable parent refused to work, his
or her family’s NIT benefit would be reduced by $300 in the bill sent to Congress, an amount
which was raised to $500 by the Committee on Ways and Means, but not eliminated entirely.
MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 220. Thus, the “work requirement” was really more of a work
incentive, a moderate penalty for refusing to work. Id.
119. The maximum benefit varied depending on family size: $500 per person for the first two
family members and $300 per person for each additional family member. WELFARE REFORM
FACT SHEET, supra note 117, at 229, 230. Thus, a family of eight would have qualified for a
maximum benefit of $2800. Id. At $1600 for a family of four, Nixon’s NIT provided a benefit (in
inflation-adjusted dollars) more than four times larger than the maximum benefit provided by
the EITC when it was first enacted and more than 50 percent larger than the maximum benefit
provided to a family of four by the current EITC. See supra note 10 and accompanying text;
supra Figures 1–2. Figure 4 below compares the EITC to Nixon’s NIT in terms of current
dollars.
120. WELFARE REFORM FACT SHEET, supra note 117, at 229, 235.
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phased out at a rate of 50 percent for each dollar of additional
121
122
income. Figures 3 and 4 below illustrate the impact of these
programs.
Figure 3. Nixon NIT Benefit Schedule, Family of Four
$5,000
$4,000
Total
Income

$3,000
$2,000

NIT
Benefit

$1600 Income Floor

$1,000
$0
$0

$1,000

$2,000 $3,000
Earned Income

$4,000

$5,000

Figure 4. Comparison of Benefit Provided Under Nixon’s NIT and
2015 EITC for a Family of Four
$12,000
Nixon's
NIT
(Inflation
Adjusted)

Value of Benefit

$10,000
$8,000
$6,000

2015 EITC

$4,000
$2,000
$0
$0

$10,000 $20,000 $30,000 $40,000 $50,000
Earned Income

121. Id. A 50 percent phaseout rate is much higher than the applicable rate under the
current EITC, which ranges from 7.65 percent to 21.06 percent, see supra Figures 1–2, but it was
a significant improvement over the AFDC, which imposed a 100 percent phaseout rate, see
supra note 96.
122. The author created Figures 3 and 4 based on information contained in WELFARE
REFORM FACT SHEET, supra note 117, at 235.
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Although conservative economist Milton Friedman had come up
123
with the idea for the NIT, Nixon’s implementation was far from
politically conservative, a fact he tried to conceal. A negative income
tax is inherently neither conservative nor liberal; rather, it is a tool
that can be presented as consistent with either side’s preferred policy
124
objectives. In the case of Nixon’s FAP, the NIT provided a
125
guaranteed minimum income, “an idea of the left.” In fact, the
126
FAP’s large-scale guaranteed-income provision made the proposal
arguably “the most progressive welfare reform theretofore proposed
127
by an American president.” Fearing rejection by conservatives and
128
by the public, Nixon endeavored to make the FAP seem more
129
conservative than it was. In a speech about the proposal, Nixon
130
denied that it implemented a guaranteed income, characterized the
131
132
plan’s modest work incentive as a “work requirement,” and
133
generally used rhetoric that would appeal to conservatives. At least
some listeners immediately saw through the façade: shortly after
Nixon’s speech, James Reston, a New York Times columnist,
remarked that the President had “cloaked a remarkably progressive
134
welfare policy in conservative language.”

123. See supra Part III.A.1.
124. For example, conservatives, like Milton Friedman, might use the NIT to replace
welfare, whereas progressives may use it to redistribute income.
125. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 127 (“The original proponents of a guaranteed
income tended to be apocalyptic about capitalism and more or less disdainful of bourgeois
virtue.”).
126. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
127. William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REV.
1431, 1501 (1986); see also BURKE & BURKE, supra note 86, at 127 (noting the observation in the
press that Nixon’s FAP was “more radical than virtually anything done by the Johnson
administration”). Interestingly, Robert F. Kennedy rejected the idea of a guaranteed income
during his 1968 presidential campaign as a proposal to “pay men to sit at home.” MOYNIHAN,
supra note 87, at 61–62.
128. In a 1968 Gallup Poll, 58 percent of those surveyed opposed guaranteed income
because they perceived it as undermining the incentive to work—“nobody should get something
for nothing.” MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 245.
129. One of Nixon’s speechwriters stressed that the primary purpose of Nixon’s speech
about the FAP was “to make a radical proposal seem conservative.” Id. at 218.
130. Richard Nixon, President of the U.S., Address to the Nation on Domestic Programs
(Aug. 8, 1969), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2191 [http://perma.cc/6N4B-KV3Q].
131. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
132. Nixon, supra note 130.
133. See, e.g., id. (“What America needs now is not more welfare, but more ‘workfare.’”).
134. James Reston, President Nixon, Poverty and Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1969, at E10.
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Nixon’s efforts to control the message surrounding the FAP did
not quell resistance from either liberal or conservative forces. An
optimistic Nixon hoped conservatives would accept at face value his
conservative portrayal of the FAP while liberals would look past his
135
words and regard the proposal’s progressive substance. To some
136
extent, just the opposite happened. Liberal activists opposed
Nixon’s FAP because they (1) believed his assertion that it was not
137
really a guaranteed income, (2) feared that the NIT was a pretext
138
for unraveling existing antipoverty measures, (3) felt that, even if
139
the NIT was a guaranteed income, it was insufficient, (4) simply
140
141
distrusted and disliked President Nixon, and (5) did not want to
see the President achieve a victory on “their” social-reform
142
143
territory. Some conservatives on the other hand denounced the
144
145
FAP as a redistributive attack on self-reliance, emphasizing their

135. MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 216–17.
136. Liberal opposition forces included the National Welfare Rights Organization
(NWRO), the Congressional Black Caucus, the California CAP Directors Association, the
National Association of Social Workers, the American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees, and the National Urban League. Id. at 226, 249, 311, 318, 325, 339–40.
Notably, the AFL-CIO did not actively oppose the FAP, treating the proposal instead with
“tolerant ambivalence.” Id. at 276, 285.
137. Id. at 127.
138. Id. Though Nixon’s FAP would have, in large part, displaced the AFDC, welfare
recipients would have received at least the same level of benefits and in many cases greater
benefits. WELFARE REFORM FACT SHEET, supra note 117, at 229, 231. In particular, the
Southern states, where state-administered AFDC benefits were notoriously sparse, would have
seen an increase in benefits. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 163.
139. The NWRO, for example, wanted to raise the minimum guaranteed income from $1600
to $5500 for a family of four. MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 247. Today, a $5500 guaranteed
income would equal $35,568. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 10. Such a proposal
would have required providing benefits to over half of the U.S. population and would have cost
about $415 billion a year in inflation-adjusted dollars. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 247.
140. Distrust for President Nixon was particularly acute among African Americans.
MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 263–68.
141. See id. at 365–66 (observing that liberal opposition to the FAP was due in part to a
“loathing for Nixon”).
142. Id. at 440–42, 446.
143. Notable conservative opponents included Ronald Reagan, then governor of California;
William F. Buckley, Jr., editor of National Review; and Milton Friedman, conservative
economist and father of the NIT. Id. at 365, 370.
144. Id. at 372.
145. This argument had two primary elements: (1) the FAP’s work incentive was insufficient
and (2) its 50 percent phaseout provision, in concert with other various income phaseouts, was
estimated to impose marginal tax rates as high as 80 percent on welfare-dependent (that is,
nonworking) families, which chilled their entry into the labor market. Id. at 369–72, 411–12.
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disappointment that the provision added to, rather than replaced, the
146
patchwork of existing public-assistance programs. Nixon and his
administration struggled to adequately address either side’s concerns
147
due, in part, to the NIT’s relative complexity. Meanwhile, in the din
of all this political maneuvering, the political parties lost sight of the
148
fact that a strong majority of the public supported the FAP.
Facing political headwinds from both the right and left, the FAP
sailed into a Congress in which Democrats controlled both the House
149
and Senate. The House Committee on Ways and Means was the
first to act, voting to approve Nixon’s FAP by a remarkable vote of
150
twenty-one to three. Representative Wilbur D. Mills, chairman of
151
the Committee, sponsored the bill and advocated on its behalf,
repeating Nixon’s claim that the FAP was not a guaranteed-income
152
proposal. The House passed the bill by a vote of 243 to 155, with 63
153
percent of House Democrats and 59 percent of House Republicans
154
voting in favor.
The administration’s hopes were high that the Senate, widely
155
considered more liberal than the House, would follow suit. The
Senate Finance Committee, however, failed to report the FAP to the
156
Senate floor in part due to strategic Democratic opposition and the

Analysis later revealed that marginal tax rates could be even higher than 80 percent. See infra
note 158 and accompanying text.
146. Friedman lamented that the FAP as an additional public-assistance program was “a
striking example of how to spoil a good idea.” MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 370. The NIT as he
conceived it would have replaced rather than added to the existing welfare scheme. See supra
notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
147. MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 115, 139–40, 215–16.
148. Id. at 268–69.
149. Id. at 418, 439; see also U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS
CONGRESSIONAL PICTORIAL DIRECTORY 181 (1969) (showing that Democrats held a majority,
holding fifty-seven seats, in the U.S. Senate during the 91st Congress).
150. The three dissenting votes were Democrats who opposed the working poor being
“added to the welfare rolls” and the prioritization of cash payments over work incentives. H.R.
REP. NO. 91-904, at 84 (1970).
151. Family Assistance Act of 1970, H.R. 16311, 91st Cong. (1970).
152. MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 431.
153. George H.W. Bush, a congressman from Texas at the time, was one of only three Texas
congressmen and the sole Republican from that state to vote in favor of the bill. Id. at 438.
154. Id. at 437–38.
155. Id. at 439, 441.
156. See id. at 446–52 (discussing multiple strategies).

ADAMSON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

3/14/2016 12:22 PM

THE EITC’S UNDERTHEORIZATION

1459

157

regional makeup of the Committee, but principally because of
revelations about unintended work disincentives of high marginal tax
rates implicated by the FAP and its interaction with other social158
welfare programs. Though Nixon’s administration scrambled to
159
revise the FAP and renew the fight, it never fully overcame
160
concerns about work disincentives. The revised bill was defeated in
the Finance Committee by a vote of ten to four, with seven of the
161
Committee’s ten Democrats voting against it.
3. President Gerald Ford’s Income Supplement Program. Nixon
failed to enact his NIT, but the administration of his successor,
President Gerald Ford, did not give up on the idea. In 1974, the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare under Ford
162
introduced the Income Supplement Program (ISP), which would
have implemented an NIT to replace Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC), Food Stamps, and Supplemental Security Income
163
164
(SSI). Under the ISP, an individual or family would receive an
NIT payment in an amount “equal to one-half of the difference
165
between its actual income level and its breakeven income level.”

157. Committee Democrats hailed primarily from Southern states where the FAP was
particularly unpopular, and committee Republicans came from “Western states where welfare
was a minimal problem, and reform a marginal concern.” Id. at 455.
158. Id. at 474–81. Programs like Medicaid and public housing had income thresholds such
that an individual’s benefits were cut off completely if she earned more than the threshold
amount. Thus, earning a single additional dollar of income might cause an individual to lose
thousands of dollars in public-assistance benefits. Republican Senator John J. Williams showed
that these “notch effects,” in concert with state and federal taxes, Social Security taxes, and the
FAP phaseout could impose effective marginal tax rates above 100 percent. Id. at 474, 480. In
other words, under some (atypical) scenarios involving the FAP, individuals would be better off
financially “sit[ting] in a rocking chair” than working to earn additional income. Id. at 481.
159. Id. at 483–98.
160. Id. at 534–35.
161. Id. at 535.
162. OFFICE OF INCOME SEC. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE,
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS PAPER NO. 11, INCOME SUPPLEMENT PROGRAM: 1974 HEW WELFARE
REPLACEMENT PROPOSAL 7 (1976).
163. See id. at 8, 11 (“AFDC, SSI and Food Stamps could be absorbed into a more efficient,
consolidated negative income tax.”).
164. Unlike Nixon’s FAP, the ISP provided benefits to both single adults and childless
couples. BRIAN STEENSLAND, THE FAILED WELFARE REVOLUTION: AMERICA’S STRUGGLE
OVER GUARANTEED INCOME POLICY 179 (2008).
165. OFFICE OF INCOME SEC. POLICY, supra note 162, at A-2. The ISP’s “breakeven income
level” was equal to a family’s standard deduction plus its personal exemptions. Id. “[T]ogether,
the standard deduction and personal exemptions ensure that taxpayers are not taxed on an
amount of income roughly equal to the official poverty level, as adjusted for family size.”
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Figure 5 below provides a sample illustration for a family of four. In
effect, the ISP would have provided a guaranteed income of $3600 for
167
168
a family of four. Ford never fully embraced the proposal, and
169
Congress rejected it before it ever gained much momentum.
Figure 5. Ford Administration’s ISP, Family of Four
$8,000
$7,000
$6,000
Total
Income

$5,000
$4,000

$3600 Breakeven Income Level

$3,000

NIT
Benefit

$2,000
$1,000
$$0

$1,000 $2,000 $3,000 $4,000 $5,000 $6,000 $7,000
Earned Income

B. The EITC’s Enactment
Though his administration’s NIT proposal failed, President Ford
170
would end up signing into law the first federal NIT, the “Earned

SCHMALBECK & ZELENAK, supra note 19, at 11. Thus, the ISP’s “breakeven point” was useful
for two reasons: (1) it provided a reasonable cutoff point for NIT payments (NIT recipients
would not receive payments beyond the family size–adjusted poverty level), and (2) it avoided
the inefficiency of requiring a family to pay taxes to Treasury on the one hand while receiving
NIT payments from Treasury on the other.
166. The author created Figure 5 based on information contained in OFFICE OF INCOME
SEC. POLICY, supra note 162, at E-1 to E-2.
167. See id. (“A family of four with no other income would receive an annual benefit of
$3,600.”).
168. See STEENSLAND, supra note 164, at 179 (“Despite the fact that Ford had voted for the
FAP twice as a member of Congress, he rejected [an NIT proposal] in favor of more
incremental goals.”).
169. See Ventry, supra note 97, at 24–25 (describing reasons for the ISP’s rejection, which
included its being too similar to FAP, redistributive, not sufficiently pro-work and pro-growth,
and not doing enough to “alleviate the welfare problem”).
170. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 18, at 6.
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171

Income Credit” (EIC). Senate Finance Committee Chairman,
172
Democrat Russell Long, was a key opponent of Nixon’s FAP. Even
before the FAP’s defeat, Long had begun to push his own variation of
173
174
an NIT, which provided a payment equal to 10 percent of income
175
for workers who earned $4000 or less. Long, who had caustically
176
criticized the FAP for its work disincentives, designed his proposal
to mitigate work disincentives by phasing out payments at a rate of 25
177
percent instead of 50 percent, and to provide payments only to the
178
working poor. Long’s proposal was defeated in 1972, but, through
179
his continuing efforts, it remained visible in the policy discussion.
When President Ford called for $16 billion in tax cuts in his 1975
180
State of the Union address, Long seized the opportunity to renew
the fight for his proposal, which by that time he had renamed the
181
“Earned Income Credit.” Long got his EIC into the Tax Reduction

171. Although the credit was originally dubbed the “Earned Income Credit,” it is commonly
known today as the “Earned Income Tax Credit.” See IRS, supra note 22 (using the terms
“EITC” and “EIC” interchangeably, but listing “EITC” first). This Note uses the term “Earned
Income Credit” and abbreviation “EIC” only when referring to the credit in its earliest
postenactment stages.
172. Long, motivated by his “implacable hostility” toward the FAP vocally opposed the
proposal as “a guaranteed wage for not working,” offered an alternative proposal, and
strategically delayed action on the bill long enough to enable special interest groups to organize
lobbying efforts against it. BURKE & BURKE, supra note 86, at 177, 183–85.
173. Long was careful not to refer to his proposal as an NIT or guaranteed income, instead
characterizing it as a “tax cut,” “work subsidy,” “tax refund,” “tax credit,” and “work bonus.”
118 CONG. REC. 33,010, 33,013 (1972) (statement of Sen. Russell Long).
174. This 10 percent payment was intended to “refund” the amount of Social Security taxes
paid by low-income workers and most of such taxes paid by employers on their behalf. Id. at
33,010, 33,013. Framed as a Social Security tax refund, the amount of the payment had no
connection to family size. Id. at 33,013.
175. Id. at 33,010.
176. Long once condemned Nixon’s FAP as enabling “people who lay about all day making
love and producing illegitimate babies.” MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 523.
177. Compare 118 CONG. REC. at 33,010 (statement of Sen. Russell Long) (explaining that
payments under Long’s proposal would be phased out at a rate of 25 percent for income over
$4000), with supra note 121 and accompanying text (demonstrating the 50 percent phaseout of
Nixon’s NIT proposal); supra Figures 3–4 (same).
178. Compare 118 CONG. REC. 33,010 (statement of Sen. Russell Long) (“[T]he benefits are
entirely work related.”), with supra note 118 and accompanying text (explaining how
employable nonworking individuals and their families could still receive Nixon’s NIT).
179. Ventry, supra note 97, at 23.
180. Gerald R. Ford, President of the U.S., State of the Union (Jan. 15, 1975),
http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/speeches/750028.htm [http://perma.cc/H479-AZR6].
181. 121 CONG. REC. 7230 (1975) (statement of Sen. Russell Long). Long had also changed
his proposal slightly, targeting the credit to those with dependents and reducing his suggested
phaseout rate to 10 percent. Id.

ADAMSON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1462

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/14/2016 12:22 PM

[Vol. 65:1439

182

Act of 1975’s final version, which President Ford signed into law on
183
March 29, 1975. Though the EIC might have been characterized as
184
an NIT or structured as welfare reform or guaranteed income, the
concept that originated as Friedman’s NIT proposal finally achieved
185
political success as a new kind of tax credit and a relatively small
186
in a familiar-seeming tax-reduction bill. Figure 6
provision
illustrates how the EIC compares in size and structure to the modern187
day EITC.
Figure 6. Comparison Between 2015 EITC and 1975 EIC, Family of
Four
$6,000.00

Value of Credit

$5,000.00
2015 EITC
$4,000.00
$3,000.00
$2,000.00

1975 EIC
(Inflation
Adjusted)

$1,000.00
$0.00
$0

$10,000 $20,000 $30,000 $40,000 $50,000
Earned Income

182. H.R. REP. NO. 94-120, at 58–59 (1975).
183. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
184. Apparently, only opponents of the EIC characterized it as an NIT. See, e.g., H.R. REP.
NO. 94-19, at 101 (1975) (“[T]o inaugurate [a negative income tax] in an emergency tax cut bill is
silly.”); id. at 95 (“[T]he ‘earned income’ credit . . . introduces a ‘negative income tax’ to the tax
code and includes in a so-called ‘tax cut’ many who now pay no taxes. This is neither the time
nor the place for such a provision.”); id. at 89 (“To the extent that [the EIC] is available to
persons who have no tax liability, it amounts to a negative income tax.”).
185. The EIC was the first refundable tax credit enacted at the federal level. CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 18, at 6.
186. That the EIC was modest in cost ($3.59 billion in 2015 dollars) “reflected the prevailing
welfare reform consensus” that public resources could be used to reduce welfare dependency
but not poverty. Ventry, supra note 97, at 25.
187. The author created Figure 6 based on information contained in Rev. Proc. 2014-61,
2014-47 I.R.B. 863, and the Tax Reduction Act of 1975.
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C. Expansion
188

Since the EIC—which is now popularly known as the EITC —
was enacted during the Ford administration, every U.S. president has
signed into law an EITC expansion.
1. President Jimmy Carter. President Jimmy Carter initially tried
to expand the EITC as part of a larger welfare-reform proposal. In
1977, President Carter announced that “continu[ing]” the EITC—
189
which was scheduled to expire at the end of that year —“to help the
working poor” would be one of twelve policy goals he hoped his
190
welfare-reform proposal would achieve. In fact, Carter’s Program
for Better Jobs and Income (PBJI) went beyond merely continuing
191
the EITC. Instead, it proposed to expand the credit to provide
192
benefits “almost up to the median income level.” Some members of
Carter’s administration, however, were disappointed that the
proposed expansion extended some benefits to middle-income
193
families rather than targeting low-income households exclusively.
The latter approach would have better enabled Carter to achieve his
“desired distribution of benefits” without a corresponding “rapid
194
expansion of the welfare caseload.” Echoing the demise of Nixon’s
195
FAP, the PBJI was met by hostility from both conservatives and
196
liberals, and Carter ultimately dropped it from his agenda in 1978.

188. See supra note 171.
189. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (amending the EITC to expire at the end of 1977).
190. Jimmy Carter, President of the U.S., Welfare Reform Remarks at a News Briefing on
Goals and Guidelines (May 2, 1977), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7434 [http://
perma.cc/2KX6-V2VX].
191. Under Carter’s PBJI, the EITC would have added an additional 5 percent credit on top
of the existing credit that would have kicked in when a family surpassed $4000 in earnings and
phased out starting at about $9000 in earnings. JOINT ECON. COMM., THE PROGRAM FOR
BETTER JOBS AND INCOME—A GUIDE AND A CRITIQUE 10 (1977). The precise point at which
phase out would begin depended on family size. Id.
192. Id. at 11.
193. Ventry, supra note 97, at 30.
194. Id. at 28. In addition to reducing welfare dependence, the EITC promised a number of
other policy benefits: administrative simplicity, improved work incentives, and reduced
beneficiary stigma relative to means-tested welfare. Id. at 28–29. One of the EITC’s benefits was
purely political—it appeared less costly because some of it could be scored in the budget as a
loss of tax revenue rather than a cash outlay. Id. at 29–30.
195. See supra notes 136–46 and accompanying text.
196. Ventry, supra note 97, at 30.
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Its association with the unpopular PBJI, however, did not taint
197
the EITC. In fact, the EITC had become immensely popular. In the
same year the PBJI was defeated, Congress expanded the EITC’s
income thresholds slightly and ensconced the credit as a permanent
198
fixture of the U.S. tax code.
2. President Ronald Reagan. Six years after the EITC was made
permanent, President Ronald Reagan oversaw a modest expansion.
Years before, when he was governor of California, Reagan had been
199
a vocal opponent of President Nixon’s FAP. He rejected the notion
that the government should provide a minimum income, believed that
the FAP was too expensive, and felt that it would exacerbate welfare
200
dependency rather than alleviate it. As president, Reagan acted on
201
these conservative sensibilities by cutting social-welfare spending.
Reagan’s aversion toward Nixon’s FAP—an EITC ancestor—and his
penchant for cutting welfare spending, however, did not sour his
attitude toward the EITC. In fact, Reagan signed into law a modest
202
EITC expansion toward the end of his first presidential term.

197. See LAURENCE E. LYNN, JR. & DAVID DEF. WHITMAN, THE PRESIDENT AS
POLICYMAKER: JIMMY CARTER AND WELFARE REFORM 247 (1981) (observing that by the late
1970s, the EITC had developed into “[e]verybody’s favorite” program).
198. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
199. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 365 (recalling Reagan’s participation in a televised
debate in which he sided against the FAP).
200. Steven Hayward, Editorial, Welfare Reform: Another Win for the Gipper, ASHBROOK
CTR. AT ASHLAND U. (Dec. 1999), http://ashbrook.org/publications/oped-hayward-99-gipper
[http://perma.cc/VCR7-FWWT]. Interestingly, Reagan testified before the Senate Finance
Committee regarding his opposition to the FAP and proposed refunding low-income workers’
Social Security taxes as a policy alternative. HOWARD, supra note 40, at 68. Committee
Chairman Russell Long was in attendance for Reagan’s testimony and, several months later,
introduced his strikingly similar work-bonus proposal, which would later be modified and
enacted as the EITC. Id. at 68–69. Based on this circumstantial evidence, some conservatives
credit Reagan as the true inventor of the EITC. Id. at 67–68.
201. See Ventry, supra note 97, at 31 (noting that the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation
Act of 1981, passed under President Reagan, cut $4 billion in federal and state welfare
expenditures and removed more than four hundred thousand families from the welfare rolls);
see also Mark Neal Aaronson, Scapegoating the Poor: Welfare Reform All Over Again and the
Undermining of Democratic Citizenship, 7 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 213, 220–21 (1996)
(describing how Reagan campaigned on and fought for welfare cuts; Congress enacted his
proposals with little resistance).
202. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, which Reagan signed into law on July 18, 1984,
increased the EITC’s maximum benefit from $500 to $550. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-369, § 1042, 98 Stat. 494, 1043–44 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.).
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During his next term, Reagan presided over a more significant
203
EITC expansion as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. In January
1984, Reagan announced his intentions to comprehensively reform
the tax code and delegated to his Treasury Secretary the task of
204
developing a proposal. Shortly after Reagan’s November 1984
reelection, his Treasury Department released a report, nicknamed
205
“Treasury I,” that called for the EITC to be expanded and indexed
206
for inflation. The Treasury Department advocated EITC expansion,
207
along with two other proposals, in order to (1) eliminate nearly all
families with incomes below the poverty line from the income-tax
208
rolls and (2) ensure that its tax-reform proposal approached
209
distributional neutrality overall. President Reagan altered many of
Treasury I’s details before releasing his official proposal (“Treasury
210
211
II”), but he kept intact the EITC’s expansion and indexation.
Some Republicans lamented that EITC indexation and similar
proposals in Reagan’s tax-reform plan, paid for with corporate tax
increases, amounted to a windfall for “low-income Democrats at
212
enormous expense to core Republican constituencies.” But such

203. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 111, 100 Stat. 2085, 2107–08 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
204. See Ronald Reagan, President of the U.S., State of the Union (Jan. 25, 1984),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=40205 [http://perma.cc/UF6Y-RCKK] (“I am asking
[Treasury] Secretary Don Regan for a plan for action to simplify the entire tax code.”).
205. TIMOTHY J. CONLAN, MARGARET T. WRIGHTSON & DAVID R. BEAM, TAXING
CHOICES: THE POLITICS OF TAX REFORM 46 (1990).
206. The Treasury Department proposed indexing the EITC’s maximum benefit and its
phaseout thresholds. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 37, 71
(1984).
207. The other two proposals were (1) increasing the personal exemption by nearly 100
percent and (2) increasing the standard deduction. CONLAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 62.
208. Id. President Nixon was successful in eliminating impoverished families from the
income-tax rolls in 1969. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text. But inflation in the
1970s gradually unraveled Nixon’s efforts by driving low-income taxpayers into higher tax
brackets. CONLAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 62.
209. See CONLAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 64 (explaining that achieving distributional
neutrality—that is, reforming the tax code so that no income class, with the exception of the
working poor, would bear a larger or smaller share of the overall tax burden than before—was
one of the Treasury Department’s ground rules for tax reform). Democrats and Republicans in
Congress agreed with the Treasury Department that tax reform should achieve distributional
neutrality. HOWARD, supra note 40, at 148.
210. CONLAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 74.
211. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS
FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY 18 (1985).
212. CONLAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 87.
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protests did not deter Reagan, who coveted tax reform’s potential
213
214
benefits, and, by 1985, made tax reform his top domestic priority.
215
Treasury II underwent changes in the Democrat-controlled House,
216
the Republican-controlled Senate, and in conference between the
217
218
two. But Reagan’s EITC proposal survived and grew, and when
219
he signed into law the Tax Reform Act of 1986, he touted the bill as
“the best antipoverty bill [and] the best profamily measure . . . to ever
220
come out of the Congress of the United States.”
3. President George H.W. Bush. President Reagan’s Vice
President and successor, President George H.W. Bush, further
expanded the EITC and amended it to be more generous to families
with children. When then–Vice President Bush ran for president in
1988, family issues were high on the priority list of both political
221
parties. For his part, Bush campaigned on helping families by
222
creating targeted tax credits. In his first year as president, Bush set
out to fulfill his promise by proposing a new refundable tax credit to
provide financial support to working parents of young children, the
223
design of which closely resembled the EITC. In 1990, President
Bush’s Supplemental Young Child Credit (SYCC) was added to the
EITC as a 5 percent bonus credit for families with children under the

213. Reagan saw tax reform as an opportunity to lower tax rates, increase long-term support
for the Republican Party, and cement his domestic-policy legacy. Id. at 47, 70–71.
214. Id. at 94.
215. Id. at 116–28.
216. Id. at 163–66, 174–76, 178–79, 181–86.
217. Id. at 218–21.
218. See HOWARD, supra note 40, at 148–49 (explaining that EITC expansion—a proposal
that never faced significant opposition—helped tax-reform legislators achieve overall
distributional neutrality by offsetting reform measures that benefited the wealthy).
219. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
220. Ronald Reagan, President of the U.S., Remarks on Signing the Tax Reform Act (Oct.
22, 1986), http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-5678 [http://perma.cc/TKR2-TFVC].
221. HOWARD, supra note 40, at 152.
222. Id. at 153.
223. Bush’s new child tax credit would have provided families with children under the age of
four with a benefit of 14 percent of earned income up to a maximum benefit of $1000, which
would then phase out at a rate of 20 percent for families with incomes between $8000 and
$13,000. George H.W. Bush, President of the U.S., Statement on Proposed Child-Care
Legislation (Mar. 15, 1989), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=16789 [http://
perma.cc/Y4YW-TLJC].
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224

age of one. President Bush also supported amendments to the EITC
225
that expanded the credit and—as an additional perk for families—
adjusted it to provide additional benefits to larger families for the first
226
time. Between the beginning of Reagan’s presidency and the end of
Bush’s, the EITC grew at an average annual rate of 11.4 percent,
227
faster than any other major U.S. social program during that time.
4. President Bill Clinton. Upon taking office, President Bill
Clinton attached policy objectives of his own to the fast-moving EITC
vehicle. First, President Clinton saw EITC expansion as a tool for
fighting poverty. In his first speech before Congress, Clinton shared
his vision for the EITC to become a work-premised living-wage
guarantee for parents: “[I]f you work 40 hours a week and you’ve got
228
a child in the house, you will no longer be in poverty.” Second, like
229
Reagan before him, Clinton relied on the EITC to solve a budget230
politics quandary: expanding the EITC would be expensive and was
therefore inconsistent with Clinton’s campaign promise to reduce the
231
federal deficit. At the same time, Clinton’s proposed energy tax—
designed to offset EITC costs and reduce the deficit—was criticized
232
as disproportionately burdensome on low-income individuals. The
two proposals were therefore perfect complements in a clever
224. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11,111, 104 Stat.
1388, 1388-408 to -413 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2012)). President Clinton’s
administration presided over the SYCC’s elimination in 1993 as part of its efforts to restructure
and expand the EITC. Michael J. Caballero, The Earned Income Tax Credit: The Poverty
Program that Is Too Popular, 48 TAX LAW. 435, 450–52 (1995).
225. See George H.W. Bush, President of the U.S., Statement on Signing the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (Nov. 5, 1990), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=19000 [http://perma.cc/9MX9-RZEQ] (confirming that Bush and his
administration requested and strongly supported the expansion and creation of tax credits for
families).
226. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 § 11,111.
227. See HOWARD, supra note 40, at 141.
228. Bill Clinton, President of the U.S., Address Before a Joint Session of Congress (Feb.
17, 1993), http://millercenter.org/president/clinton/speeches/speech-3435 [http://perma.cc/
M7TU-JZXQ].
229. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
230. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE
ADMINISTRATION’S REVENUE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN THE FISCAL YEAR 1994 BUDGET 3
(1993) (estimating that President Clinton’s proposed EITC expansion would cost about $28
billion over five years).
231. See Ruth Marcus & Ann Devroy, Asking Americans to ‘Face Facts,’ Clinton Presents
Plan to Raise Taxes, Cut Deficit, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1993, at A1 (noting President Clinton’s
campaign pledge to “halve the deficit in four years”).
232. Caballero, supra note 224, at 448.
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legislative scheme—by providing additional benefits to the poor, the
EITC expansion mitigated worries about the regressive impact of the
energy tax while the energy tax softened concerns about swelling
EITC costs.
President Clinton’s ambitions to reduce poverty through the
EITC apparently did not extend to individuals without children. His
proposal provided the EITC to individuals who did not have a
233
“qualifying dependent,” but only in an amount sufficient to offset
234
his new energy tax, thus yielding no net antipoverty assistance.
President Clinton proposed a number of additional changes in
accordance with his antipoverty policy goals. Clinton’s plan
drastically increased the EITC’s credit rate and phase-out range in
235
order to increase a family of four’s maximum credit 123 percent. In
addition, Clinton proposed to make EITC benefits more responsive
to family size, providing a 20 percent larger credit to households with
multiple qualifying dependents than to households with only one
qualifying dependent.
After the EITC expansion cruised through the House and
survived turbulence in the Senate, President Clinton signed it into law
236
as part of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA). Both
Clinton’s energy tax and his EITC expansion were approved, largely
237
unaltered, by the House. The Senate, on the other hand, exerted far
more resistance, effectively killing Clinton’s energy tax and slashing
238
his EITC expansion by about one-third. Despite the fact that
OBRA no longer included Clinton’s energy-tax proposal, the EITC
for individuals without a qualifying dependent was included in the
239
conference bill. That provision, as part of a compromise expansion,
240
ultimately survived and was signed into law on August 10, 1993.

233. Id. at 451. In the current EITC, the analogous term is “qualifying child,” which
generally refers to a taxpayer’s child but can also refer to a sibling, niece, or nephew. 26 U.S.C.
§ 152(c) (2012).
234. See Caballero, supra note 224, at 451–52 (explaining that “[t]he credit for these
individuals would offset the effects of the [energy] tax, and therefore was considerably smaller
than the credit for individuals with qualifying dependents”).
235. Id. at 451.
236. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312.
237. Caballero, supra note 224, at 454.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 456.
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Individuals without qualifying children still receive the EITC today,
241
but their credit amount is still strictly limited.
5. President George W. Bush. Eleven years after the first Bush
administration acted to expand and to supplement the EITC,
President George W. Bush presided over a further expansion as part
of his 2001 tax-cut legislation. Bush made large tax cuts the
242
Shortly after
cornerstone of his 2000 presidential campaign.
243
assuming the presidency, he introduced a $1.6 trillion tax-cut plan
244
that proposed to, inter alia, reduce the marriage penalty by reviving
245
an expired 10 percent deduction for two-earner couples. Critics
attacked the President’s tax-cut plan because it provided greater tax
246
savings to wealthy taxpayers than lower-income taxpayers. Thus,
when the Republican-controlled House Ways and Means Committee
247
introduced a bill to increase the EITC for married couples, it
intended to accomplish two objectives: respond to President Bush’s
248
call for marriage-penalty relief and neutralize criticism by making
249
Bush’s overall proposal more progressive. On June 7, 2001, Bush
signed into law the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation

241. See supra Figures 1–2.
242. Richard W. Stevenson, Bush Tax Plan: The Debate Takes Shape, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26,
2000),
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/26/us/the-2000-campaign-the-tax-plan-bush-tax-planthe-debate-takes-shape.html [https://perma.cc/7DZQ-XJWZ].
243. Mona Lewandoski, The Bush Tax Cuts of 2001 and 2003: A Brief Legislative History 9
(Harvard Law School, Budget Briefing Paper No. 37, 2008), http://www.law.harvard.edu/
faculty/hjackson/2001-2003TaxCuts_37.pdf [http://perma.cc/BPQ6-84LE].
244. Married individuals suffer from a marriage penalty when they pay higher taxes under a
joint return than they would have paid as single taxpayers. SCHMALBECK & ZELENAK, supra
note 19, at 772. Marriage penalties are most severe “when the division of earnings between the
spouses is relatively even.” U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2002 TAX RELIEF PROPOSALS 5 (2001).
245. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 244, at 5.
246. See e.g., SHAPIRO & FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at vii (“Under the Bush plan, after-tax
income for the top one percent of taxpayers would grow by 6.2 percent. This is more than three
times the income growth of 1.9 percent for the fifth of the population in the middle of the
income spectrum.”); Bob McIntyre, CTJ Analysis of Bush Plan Updated to 2001 Levels, CTJ
NEWS (Citizens for Tax Justice, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 27, 2001, at 1–3, http://www.ctj.org/
pdf/gwbin01.pdf [http://www.perma.cc/DP3Y-KHXA] (noting that “more than sixty percent of
Bush’s proposed tax cuts would go to the best-off 10 percent of Americans”).
247. H.R. 6, 107th Cong. (2001).
248. H.R. REP. NO. 107-29, at 11 (2001).
249. Critics, however, were not placated. See id. at 34 (“[T]he [EITC-related] improvements
made by the Chairman to the Bush proposals do little to change the overall unfairness of the
Republican tax plan.”).
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250

Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), which included the House’s proposal to
251
expand the EITC for married taxpayers.
6. President Barack Obama. President Barack Obama followed
in the tradition of his predecessors by enacting family-oriented EITC
expansions. As a presidential candidate, Obama promised to
“increase [EITC] benefits for families with three or more children,
252
and reduce the EITC marriage penalty.” Within thirty days of
becoming president, Obama delivered on those promises by signing
into law EITC expansions as part of the $789 billion post-financial253
crisis economic stimulus measure, the American Recovery and
254
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA). President Obama signed those
EITC expansions into law as part of the Tax Relief, Unemployment
255
Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 and again
256
as part of the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012.
IV. THE EITC’S PATH-DEPENDENT PAST
This Part examines the legislative history detailed in Part III
through the theoretical lens of path dependence. Specifically, it
identifies increasing-return factors that have helped carry the EITC
257
forward with its basic, original structure intact : large set-up costs,

250. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115
Stat. 38 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
251. Specifically, EGTRRA increased by $3000, in $1000 periodic increments between tax
years 2002 and 2007, the beginning and ending of the EITC phaseout. The legislation also
provided that the new phaseout thresholds would be indexed for inflation after 2007. JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, JCS-1-03, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN
THE 107TH CONGRESS 33 (2003).
252. OBAMA FOR AMERICA, BARACK OBAMA’S COMPREHENSIVE TAX PLAN 2 (2008),
http://halebobb.com/Obama/Factsheet_Tax_Plan_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8J2F-PXB4].
253. David M. Herszenhorn & Carl Hulse, House and Senate in Deal for $789 Billion
Stimulus, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2009, at A1.
254. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, div. B, tit. I,
§ 1002, 123 Stat. 115, 312 (amending 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2012)) (increasing temporarily the credit
percentage for taxpayers with three or more qualifying children and reducing the EITC
marriage penalty).
255. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-312, tit. I, § 103, 124 Stat. 3296, 3299 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 32(b)(3) (2012)).
256. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, tit. I, § 103(c), 126 Stat.
2313, 2319–20 (amending 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2012)).
257. See Caballero, supra note 224, at 435 (noting that the underlying structure of the EITC
has generally remained unchanged since it was enacted).
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collective action, policymakers’ short-term orientation, and status quo
bias.
A. Legislative Analogue to Large Set-Up Costs
President Nixon’s failed efforts to enact his FAP illustrate how
costly it can be to attempt radical policy innovation. Nixon expended
substantial political capital for the majority of his first term and
258
ultimately achieved no legislative victory. By extending his hand to
political opponents with an extraordinarily progressive welfare259
260
reform proposal, Nixon alienated political allies and was snubbed
261
by opponents anyway.
Senator Long also experienced high
legislative costs. Even though his EIC was much less ambitious than
Nixon’s FAP, it still required three years of steady effort by Long,
chairman of the powerful Senate Finance Committee, to orchestrate
262
its enactment.
These examples show how the EITC only came into being after
significant start-up costs, which paved the way for subsequent path
dependence. In a production process, high start-up or fixed costs
create an incentive to rely on previously incurred fixed costs for as
263
long as feasible. To illustrate, imagine an old printing press in which
letters must be painstakingly arranged by hand. A publisher would
have an incentive to continue printing using preset printing plates for
as long as possible, tolerating incremental textual obsolescence and
favoring incremental changes over large ones. This concept, by
analogy, helps explain why policymakers rationally would not
overhaul or replace the EITC, even if some of the purposes
underlying its original design were merely a product of historical
anomaly or had otherwise become obsolete.
B. Collective Action
President Nixon’s legislative failure also illustrates how acute the
collective-action problem can be in the context of trying to enact a
revolutionary policy. Nixon’s groundbreaking FAP was a textbook

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

See supra Part III.A.2.
See supra notes 123–27 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 143–46 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 136–42, 156–61 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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public good : he could not exclude legislators from realizing the
political benefits of supporting it at the eleventh hour if it turned out
to be popular. In the meantime, they could remain passive, or even
actively oppose, the policy, thereby free riding on President Nixon’s
265
substantial lobbying and campaigning efforts.
In fact, most
legislators—even those who should have appreciated the EITC’s
266
progressive substance—did just that. More or less on his own,
267
President Nixon was no match for the winds of political resistance.
In contrast, after the EITC was enacted and its popularity was
established, it no longer exhibited the characteristics of a public good.
For example, President Reagan did not have to lobby anyone to
expand the EITC in 1986: Democrats wanted expansion and
268
Republicans accepted it as their ticket to lower tax rates. The
elevated presence of the collective-action problem in the context of
radical policy change helps explain why the EITC has not been
overhauled or substantially refined in its forty-year history.
C. Policymakers’ Short-Term Orientation
Policymakers’ short-term orientation also contributed to the
EITC’s path-dependent development. First, Nixon provides a
counterexample. Ex ante, it would have been irrational for him to
attempt such risky, costly, and ambitious policy reform if he did not
269
greatly value his long-term political legacy. But for Reagan, Clinton,
and both Bushes, expanding the EITC was either a political gain in
270
itself or the low-cost ticket to some other immediate legislative gain.
Trying to completely overhaul the EITC likely would have entailed
significant political costs and yielded only marginal short-term
benefits. This may help explain why the EITC has never been
comprehensively reevaluated.

264. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
265. For examples of such efforts, see supra notes 129–33 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 135–46 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 149–61 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 209–19 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text. It makes sense that when a policymaker
sees a single piece of legislation as one that could define her political legacy, she could
overcome any tendency to be short-term focused.
270. See supra Part III.C.
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D. Status Quo Bias
Status quo bias also played a profound role in the EITC’s
development. One of the most striking features of the EITC’s
legislative history is the extent to which conservative policymakers
have supported the EITC, the tax code’s most progressive
271
provision. One plausible explanation for this high degree of support
over time is that initial support (actual or apparent) by former
Republican presidents and notable conservatives has been selfreinforcing. As the logic goes, if Friedman originated the idea and
272
Reagan supported it, how could any conservative be against it?
Furthermore, EITC-perpetuating factors were sewn into the
fabric of congressional lawmaking. For example, the EITC appeared
less costly to budget estimators than it actually was because some of it
273
could be scored as a loss of tax revenue rather than a cash outlay.
This exceptional bang for the buck almost certainly contributed to the
EITC’s attractiveness as a policy tool and its utility in matters made
274
tricky by budget politics. Like other factors detailed above, this and
other manifestations of status quo bias may have helped propel the
EITC along its original path, with all of its random bumps and
obsolete detours.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF EITC PATH DEPENDENCE
Now that specific increasing-returns factors have been identified,
this Part presents the implications of EITC path dependence. First, it
describes how path dependence helped cause the EITC’s
undertheorization. Next, it concludes that this path dependence–
generated undertheorization is, all things considered, an advantage,
not a hindrance.

271. THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD & REBECCA THIESS, ECON. POLICY INST., THE EARNED
INCOME TAX CREDIT AND THE CHILD TAX CREDIT: HISTORY, PURPOSE, GOALS AND
EFFECTIVENESS 2 (2013), http://s3.epi.org/files/2013/The-Earned-Income-Tax-Credit.pdf
[http://www.perma.cc/XR7L-U8E7] (“The EITC is, by far, the most progressive tax expenditure
in the income tax code.”).
272. As a contemporary example of this phenomenon, House Speaker (and former House
Ways and Means Chairman) Paul Ryan recently proposed an EITC expansion that he touts as
having “conservative origins.” Brian Faler, Republicans’ Love-Hate Relationship with a Tax
Credit, POLITICO (Jan. 17, 2014, 5:04 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/01/republicansgop-earned-income-tax-credit-paul-ryan-marco-rubio-102294.html
[http://www.perma.cc/W5
GD-AJ9Y].
273. See supra note 194.
274. See supra notes 209, 229–32 and accompanying text.
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A. How Path Dependence Led to the EITC’s Undertheorization
Path dependence helps explain the EITC’s undertheorization.
Professor Zelenak bemoaned the facts that the EITC lacks “any
coherent purpose discernible from [its] structure” and that Congress
275
He thus proposed a
has never elucidated its purpose.
comprehensive overhaul that would give the EITC a unified and
276
contemporarily relevant purpose. That the EITC lacks a single
coherent purpose is a direct result of its path-dependent past. Since
the EITC was enacted, policymakers have lacked sufficient incentive
to enact the kind of foundational EITC modernization that Professor
277
Zelenak proposed.
Instead, changes have been incremental,
278
preserving the EITC’s original structure while manifesting an
279
assortment of different purposes. Some of these purposes may no
longer be relevant and others likely contributed to political ends at
the expense of good, coherent policy. For example, President
Reagan’s 1986 EITC expansion was designed to preserve
280
distributional neutrality as part of a larger tax-reform bill; President
George H.W. Bush’s EITC expansions, which prioritized families
with children under the age of one, arose out of an intensely
281
profamily political environment; President Clinton’s expansion
provided benefits to childless individuals in order to offset the effects
of an energy tax that was never enacted, but puzzlingly excluded such
282
individuals from receiving significant antipoverty benefits; President
George W. Bush’s EITC expansion was currency for political quid
pro quo and a blunt instrument for ameliorating the marriage
283
penalty; and President Obama’s EITC expansions originated as part
of a bill designed to stimulate the economy in the wake of the
284
financial crisis. With these disparate purposes being incrementally
275. Zelenak, supra note 2, at 301; see also Bird-Pollan, supra note 40, at 284 (“While the
EITC has continued to enjoy strong political support, it has also continued to suffer from an
absence of any clearly articulated purpose.”).
276. See generally Zelenak, supra note 2 (proposing to redesign the EITC to function as a
minimum-wage supplement that provides a benefit that adjusts for family size).
277. See supra Part IV.
278. See Caballero, supra note 224, at 435 (noting that the underlying structure of the EITC
has generally remained unchanged since it was enacted).
279. See supra Part III.
280. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
281. See supra Part III.C.3.
282. See supra Part III.C.4.
283. See supra Part III.C.5.
284. See supra Part III.C.3–6.
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manifest into the EITC, and with path dependence preventing
foundational modernization, it is no wonder the EITC has evolved
into an ambiguous jumble of a policy.
B. Why the EITC’s Undertheorization Is an Advantage, Not a
Hindrance
Of course, not all of the various purposes upon which the EITC
is built are obsolete, and the EITC remains extraordinarily useful
despite its enigmatical structure. For example, the EITC has played a
significant role in alleviating poverty. In the past, the income- and
285
payroll-tax systems increased the number of those in poverty.
Today, primarily due to the EITC’s enactment and expansion, those
systems reduce the number of people in poverty, particularly
286
children. In 2009, for example, the EITC “lifted 6.5 million working
287
families, including 3.3 million children, out of poverty.” Moreover,
the EITC also helps to reduce economic inequality. Progressive tax
288
systems tend to reduce inequality, and no tax provision contributes
289
more to the federal income tax’s progressivity than the EITC.
Given its utility—and despite its imperfections—policymakers
contemplating comprehensive EITC reform should proceed with
caution. Given that its structure is a manifestation of diverse
purposes, the EITC is a policy Rorschach test, providing both
conservatives and liberals plenty to admire. Conservatives can
290
applaud the EITC for its conservative origins; its status as an
291
alternative to welfare; and the role it plays in lowering marginal tax
292
293
294
rates, supporting families, and mitigating the marriage penalty.
Progressives, on the other hand, can admire the EITC’s extraordinary
285. David Kamin, Reducing Poverty, Not Inequality: What Changes in the Tax System Can
Achieve, 66 TAX L. REV. 593, 633–34 (2013).
286. Id.
287. NICOLAS JOHNSON & ERICA WILLIAMS, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, A
HAND UP: HOW STATE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDITS HELP WORKING FAMILIES ESCAPE
POVERTY IN 2011, at 3 (2011), http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-18-11sfp.pdf [http://www.perma.cc/
BPS9-UNJQ].
288. See Leonard E. Burman, Taxes and Inequality, 66 TAX L. REV. 563, 569 (2013)
(explaining that the progressivity of the federal tax system reduces economic inequality).
289. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
290. See supra Part III.
291. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 221–25 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 243–51 and accompanying text.
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295

progressivity and its efficacy in reducing poverty and income
296
inequality. Though endowing the EITC with a single unified
purpose may very well improve the EITC as a policy matter, such
improvements must be carefully weighed against the risk of
297
destroying the EITC’s politically valuable ambiguity.
If
policymakers convert ink blots into a more vivid picture, everyone
might not like what they see any more.
CONCLUSION
The EITC is special. Path-dependence analysis typically leads to
a diagnosis of policy problems. For example, Professors Steven L.
Schwarcz and Ori Sharon recently used a path-dependence lens to
diagnose inefficiencies in the treatment of derivatives transactions
298
under bankruptcy law. Though path-dependence analysis, in this
299
case, did uncover policy shortcomings, it also helped identify an
unconventional strength: ambiguity that has largely neutralized
political opposition. Theorizing the EITC—eliminating its
ambiguity—risks endangering a member of the rarest of all policy
species: one on which both parties can agree.

295. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 285–89 and accompanying text.
297. For example, conservatives may not like the EITC as much if it became, as Professor
Zelenak proposed, closely tied to the minimum wage, a policy many conservatives already
oppose. See William Finnegan, Demonizing the Minimum Wage, THE NEW YORKER: DAILY
COMMENT (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/demonizingminimum-wage [http://www.perma.cc/CM8L-B2AH] (detailing opposition to the minimum
wage among Republicans in Congress).
298. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz & Ori Sharon, The Bankruptcy-Law Safe Harbor for
Derivatives: A Path-Dependence Analysis, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1715 (2014) (examining how
the rights and immunities of creditors in bankruptcy actions result from path dependence and
explaining the problems that such path dependence can cause).
299. See supra Part V.A.

